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Abstract
IoT provides services by connecting smart devices to the Internet,
and exploiting data generated by said devices to enable value-added
services to individuals and businesses. In such cases, if data is
exposed, tampered or lost, the service would not behave correctly.
In this article, we discuss data security in IoT applications across five
dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation
and availability. We discuss how distributed ledger technology
could be used to overcome these issues and propose to use a fog
computing architecture as decentralized computational support to
deploy the ledger.
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1 Introduction
IoT applications, which are based on data captured from the end
devices, are vulnerable against a number of different attacks [6].
In this paper, we target IoT applications/services that consume
data generated by different data providers and are hosted in an
environment where there is no trust between the parties, i.e.: data
providers, infrastructure providers and IoT applications. The prob-
lem we tackle is the following: how to provide data security for
IoT streams generated by different data providers and consumed
by different data consumers (service providers via IoT applications)
in a trustless environment. Data security has the following five
dimensions:
1. Confidentiality: The data should not be accessed by any
entity other than the source or the legitimate, intended
destination of the data. (E.g. : A patient’s medical status)
2. Integrity: The data received by the receiver should be ex-
actly the data generated by the source. (E.g. : The status of a
machine in the production line in Industry 4.0 applications)
3. Authenticity: The data should be received from the genuine
source of data.
4. Non-repudiation: The data source should not be able to
deny it has produced the data
5. Availability: The generated and stored data should be reli-
ably available.
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To meet the aforementioned security requirements, we need
computing elements. For example for confidentiality, an encryption
element is needed, for non-repudiation, a minimum asymmetric
cryptographic support to sign the generated data is needed, etc. On
the other hand, one of the characteristics of IoT is heterogeneity:
refrigerator, lamp, smartphone or laptop with different computa-
tion power and battery life can be part of the network. Thus, for
providing security for this heterogeneous network we should add
an additional layer on top of the IoT one.
2 The Approach
The problem of data security, would be easier to handle if all the
generated data belonged to a single administrative entity, but in
reality, data may be generated by devices under the control of dif-
ferent administrative entities (‘data ownersâĂŹ). A data owner is
defined as an administrative entity that provides data (possibly
as a service) in an IoT ecosystem. If all the data generated by IoT
devices was owned by a single data owner, or data owners trusted
each other, then security could be addressed using well-known
security techniques. However, what if more than one data owner
exist and they do not trust each other? . In [1], [3], [8] and [4] the
problem of data security when there is single or multi data owner
is discussed. Most of these works’ focus is on data privacy and data
confidentiality and they use cryptographic key management solu-
tions to tackle the aforementioned issues. However, in this paper
we take a data-centric approach to security issues, and we exploit a
decentralized system to address the mentioned data security issues.
Our approach is based on the use of Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT) deployed on a fog infrastructure as data security provider in
a multi-data owner and multi-service provider environment, where
there is no trust between the mentioned parties. In this paper, with
a slight abuse of terminology we will refer interchangeably to DLT
as âĂŸblockchainâĂŹ.
A blockchain provides an immutable repository in a trustless
system [5]. Blockchain provides a distributed repository, whereby
every participating entity has its own copy of the whole ledger; by
using a consensus protocol, all the parties agree on a single copy of
data to be the correct one at a given time, and this copy of data can
not be changed. Blockchains can be either permissionless (anybody
can write to the blockchain) or permissioned (only a subset of nodes
are allowed to write to the blockchain). Moreover, blockchains can
be public (if any entity can verify data in the blockchain) or private
(if only participating entity can validate data on the blockchain).
As in our case, only the devices who generate data or the services
that may want to update data should be able to store/change data
on the ledger (not attackers or adversaries), we need a permissioned
blockchain. On the other hand, as we need that the data be verifiable
by all the users/service providers, we propose to use a public permis-
sioned blockchain. Blockchain is a practically immutable repository,
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Figure 1. Blockchain layer running on Fog structure
thus integrity of the data is guaranteed by design. Moreover, as it is
a distributed system and every node receives and records the data
source and the destination, the non-repudiation and authenticity
are also supported by design. On the other hand, as the Blockchain
is a distributed storage and there will be no single point of failure
the problem of availability is also solved implicitly.
To provide data confidentiality, data can be stored as an en-
crypted data on the Blockchain. The legitimate, intended data re-
ceiver, receives a pointer to the location of the data in the Blockchain
alongside the proper key to decrypt it. To transfer this key, data
source encrypts this key using the public key of the data receiver.
In our proposed architecture, depicted in Figure 1, the blockchain
acts as a soft layer able to provide data security guarantees for
IoT systems. As we need a network of distributed computation
elements to deploy the blockchain, the usage of a fog computing
approach seems a natural one.
Fog computing is a network of computing nodes that are de-
ployed close to the data sources (closer than cloud) to decrease
latency, bandwidth usage and cost in cloud applications [2]. The
IoT service can be deployed either on the Cloud or on the Fog. As
the proposed blockchain is a public, permissioned one, read access
to the blockchain is available to everyone, but write access to the
blockchain is available only to permissioned parties. Thus, if a data
provider, wants to write data on the ledger, it should be defined
as a blockchain participant. The consensus protocol that will be
used on the blockchain may vary depending on the type of service
that we deploy on our architecture. Factors such as acceptable ser-
vice latency, the computational power of the fog nodes etc. should
be taken into account when deciding which specific consensus
protocol to use. Services that need to access IoT-generated data
could read them from any node in the blockchain. In the case of
control commands to be sent to IoT devices, the controller should
have permissions to write to the blockchain. The proposed solution,
based upon the usage of DLT, presents of course some costs. The
first is bandwidth usage, because of the fog-to-fog communication
required to run the consensus protocol. This also bears a computa-
tional cost (related to the processing required to run the consensus
protocol). The last cost is storage, as all fog nodes would be required
to store the complete ledger, which may grow significantly over
time.
3 The evaluation methodology
Using attack-tree methodology introduced by Schneier [7], we can
analyze the different types of attack and the system reaction. In this
graphical approach, the undesirable event will be represented as
the root of a tree and using AND and OR gates, various causes that
a system can be attacked or defended are analyzed. In attack-tree
methodology to assure if the system is robust against attacks, there
should be no path from the attacks, which are the leaves of the tree,
to the root of the tree. In our case, we will have five different attack-
defense trees for each of the mentioned data security dimensions. In
the attack-tree approach, blockchain and encryption mechanisms
will be represented as a barrier against various sources of attacks,
then we should confirm that blockchain layer blocks all the paths
to the root of the tree.
4 Conclusion
As most of the IoT applications are powered with data generated
by end devices, it is instrumental to guarantee security of the data.
In this article we use a distributed ledger technology, coupled with
a fog computing architecture, to overcome various data security
issues. The author will pursue developing a prototypical implemen-
tation of the proposed structure during her PhD studies to analyse
attacks and the reaction of the DLT as a defense layer to the system.
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